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CLIMATE CHANGE, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIGNMENT, AND




Recently states and individuals have turned to federal common law
causes of action to provide equitable and legal relieffor climate change.
Thus far, every federal court to consider these claims has held that they
raise non-justiciable political questions consigned to the coordinate
branches. These courts reason that federal courts lack jurisdiction over
climate cases because climate change is textually committed elsewhere,
there are no judicial standards to apply, and the elected branches have
yet to render an initial policy determination about the subject. This arti-
cle concludes that these courts either misapply or misapprehend the doc-
trine. It concedes that federal common law is not the optimal or only
legal response to climate change. Yet it maintains that the political
question doctrine is a false basis for dismissing climate cases that invoke
these causes of action. The Constitution does not commit climate change
to Congress or the executive. Federal common law provides ample and
long-applied standards in cases involving disparate transboundary pol-
lution. The elected branches have made initial policy determinations
about climate change policies. Furthermore, there is good reason to
question both the doctrine's jurisprudential bases and whether its fram-
ers meant it to be applied to federal common law in general, and climate
cases in particular. Regardless, courts have rejected use of the doctrine
to dismiss analogous claims for redress based on federal common law.
The political question doctrine does not prevent courts from entering the
climate change thicket.
Whether Georgia by insisting upon this claim is doing more harm
than good to her own citizens is for her to determine. The possible
disaster to those outside the State must be accepted as a consequence
of her standing upon her extreme rights.I
t Professor of Law, Widener Law School. J.D., University of Kansas School of Law;
LL.M., Pace University School of Law (Feldshuh Fellow). The author thanks Professor Randy
Abate for comments to a draft of this article, and Patrick Clary, Widener Law '10, for proofreading
the penultimate version.
1. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
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The scope and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals the tran-
scendently legislative nature of this litigation.
2
[The court] ought not inject itself into the global warming thicket.
3
INTRODUCTION
Climate change, as Chief Justice Roberts observes in his dissenting
opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, "may be a crisis, even the most press-
ing environmental problem of our time."4 The challenge it presents may
be parts insurmountable and indifferent to political boundaries. It is not,
however, indivisible. Its causes and effects are not equally distributed.
It is caused much more by some than by others. While a global phe-
nomenon, its costs are distributed unevenly, borne more acutely by the
poor, the elderly, the infirm, and the politically disenfranchised.
The stakes are both tremendous and unknown, and transcendentally
personal. Some have nowhere to turn but in despair and desperation to
the federal courts, beckoning ossified causes of action. For example, on
February 27, 2008, the tiny City of Kivalena and the Alaska Native Vil-
lage of Kivalena-a federally recognized tribe-brought a federal law-
suit against a dozen petroleum refining, energy producing, and coal ex-
tracting companies.5 They claim that the greenhouse gases these indus-
tries emit contribute to global climate change, causing them real, palpa-
ble, harm. Invoking the federal common law of public nuisance and
other claims, they argue that these industries should pay the estimated
$400 million it will cost to relocate the community lock, stock and barrel
before it melts-schools, churches, streets, businesses, hospital, police
and fire stations, community center, people and permafrost-into the
Arctic Ocean.
What to do. Congress could force the energy, transportation and ex-
tractive sectors to change their ways or bare the economic externalities of
their climate-altering activities. It could have them shoulder their fair
share of the relocation, health care, property damage and other costs of
climate change. States could do this too, subject to federal preemption.
It does not seem, however, that such measures are likely soon to
come to pass. Congress has not enacted technology-forcing, damages-
paying legislation to address climate change. Some states have picked
up the slack with their own measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse
2. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
3. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *29
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal
quotations omitted).
5. See Climate Change Threatens Existence, Eskimo Lawsuit Says, CNN, Feb. 27, 2008,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/02/26/us.warming.ap/index.html.
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gases, promote conservation or alternative energy and transportation, and
create markets in hopes of reducing carbon output. Yet states are left
with little means either to mandate engineering responses or to be reim-
bursed for response costs.
The costs to states and individuals for responding to climate change,
including that for health care, community relocation, property damage,
shoreline loss, and technical assistance, to name a few, will likely be
unlike anything we have seen in kind or degree. Whatever uncertainties
about costs exist, however, one prediction seems an even bet: States and
individuals will be left both with the dinner bill and the dirty dishes for
the vestiges of a party-hard century of unsustainable carbon output.
Enter the common law. Public nuisance theory allows states and
individuals to seek injunctive relief and/or money damages to abate ac-
tivities that unreasonably interfere with a right common to the general
public. Yet state public nuisance causes of action are often curtailed by
limitations on liability and statutes of limitations, by requirements for
individuals to show special damages, and by other obstacles.
Enter the federal common law. Since the time Justice Holmes sat
on the Court, federal common law for public nuisance has served as a
meaningful cause of action for states and individuals to stop harmful
activities and recover the costs of transboundary pollution. So too it can
with climate change. Indeed, the legal challenges of climate change
seem a particularly cozy fit for federal common law. It is transboundary.
Legislative enactments allowing for injunctive relief or money damages
do not exist. A patchwork of state common law responses is untenable.
So one is left to wonder for what federal common law can exist if not for
climate change. And if current circumstances concerning climate change
do not warrant its use, then when possibly could it be so.
Thus, states representing almost one-half of the nation's citizenry
have brought federal common law public nuisance causes of action
against the world's largest auto manufacturing 6 and fossil fuel burning
energy companies. 7 Cities and tribes-as in Kivalena-have followed
suit. Private litigants have also brought federal common law nuisance
actions for damages caused or complicated by climate change. 8
Enter the political question doctrine. It aims to thwart the judicial
review of issues textually or prudentially consigned to Congress, the
6. Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16. Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and
Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a "Global Warming
Solution " in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591, 598 (2008) [hereinafter Automobile Emissions].
7. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
8. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2006 WL 1066645, at *2
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing under the political question doctrine private common law
cause of action brought by individuals to address effects of climate change), appeal docketed, No.
07-60756 (5th Cir. 2007).
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President, or both.9 The doctrine's political philosophy is "essentially a
function of the separation of powers"' 0 rooted in Jeffersonian notions of
constitutional theory that democracy is best served by having coordinate
elected branches resolve political questions rather than politically unac-
countable federal judges." To coin a phrase, the doctrine applies to dis-
able federal courts from reviewing matters on the theory that they "ought
not enter [the] political thicket."'
' 2
Enter the courts. Expressly declining to "enter the global warming
thicket," federal courts have thus far invoked the political question doc-
trine to dismiss federal common law causes brought by states and indi-
viduals for climate change. This means that the cause of action is dead
on arrival. There is no answer, no discovery, no standing, no proof, and
no opportunity to prove damages or "unreasonable" harm. Exit the case.
Enter a preemptive clarification and concession. First, this article
does not argue that federal courts in the United States are the premier
forum for addressing what is arguably the world's most pressing prob-
lem. It does not aim to diminish the role of international fora, Congress,
the President, agencies, the States, and citizens. The operative question
here is whether the political question doctrine prevents federal courts
from hearing climate cases rooted in federal common law. This article
concludes it does not.
Second, this article is not an aria apologia on behalf of federal
common law to address climate change. Federal common law is un-
wieldy and amorphous. To be sure, describing it is a little like describing
what Mozart's opera Magic Flute tastes like. Federal common law is
hardly the only or most efficient societal response to climate change.
But a vital response it is. Climate cases, if they are to fall, should
fail on other ground, say, because the plaintiffs fail to prove damages are
"unreasonable," or because they yield to other constitutional features.
Indeed, state and private responses to climate change raise a constellation
of other, arguably more substantial, constitutional questions. These in-
clude those under the Supremacy, 13 dormant Commerce 14 and Foreign
9. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-27 (1962) (thoroughly discussing the political ques-
tion doctrine).
10. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
11. See id
12. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
13. U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2. For assessment of preemption and climate issues, see generally
Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAvIS L. REV.
281 (2003); Sara A. Colangelo, Comment, The Politics of Preemption: An Application of Preemp-
tion Jurisprudence and Policy to California Assembly Bill 1493, 37 ENVTL. L. 175 (2007); Sarah
Olinger, Comment, Filling the Void in an Otherwise Occupied Field: Using Federal Common Law
to Regulate Carbon Dioxide in the Absence of a Preemptive Statute, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 237
(2007).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For an analysis of how the dormant Commerce Clause and
dormant Foreign Relations Clause apply to California's recent climate legislation, see generally
Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 ENvTL. L. REP.
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Relations, 15 Compact16 and Treaty 17 clauses, and standing.18  Each pro-
vides more constitutionally legitimate application to climate cases than
does the political question doctrine.
This article summarizes and evaluates the growing body of juris-
prudence relating to how the political question doctrine applies to federal
common law causes of action that address the causes and effects of cli-
mate change. Part I provides an overview of the effects of and policies
toward climate change, and the role federal common law might play in
addressing them. Part II discusses the political question doctrine's ori-
gins and legal architecture. Part III describes juridical applications of the
"textual commitment" prong of the doctrine and explains why it does not
apply to climate cases. Part IV examines how courts have applied the
prudential component of the doctrine and explains why these too do not
apply in climate cases. Part V questions whether applying the political
question doctrine to climate cases is constitutionally legitimate and
whether it was designed to apply to federal common law in general, and
climate cases in particular.
This article concludes that federal courts have thus far incorrectly
invoked the political question doctrine in climate cases under federal
common law. This erroneously foreclososes consideration of any other
factual, causal, constitutional, statutory, common law, or remedial issues
out of undue deference to the elected branches of the federal government.
10653 (2007); Peter Carl Nordberg, Note, Excuse Me, Sir, But Your Climate's on Fire: California's
S.B. 1368 and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2067 (2007).
15. See generally Hannah Chang, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Legality of California's
Link with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 37 ENvTL. L. REP. 10771 (2007) (dis-
cussing the dormant foreign affairs power and California's efforts to combat climate change). Some
question the existence of foreign-affairs preemption. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming
as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 327-28 (2005) ("If the mere appearance of an
issue on the international agenda would result in automatic preemption of state authority under the
dormant foreign affairs preemption, a good deal of the police powers of the States would become at
risk.").
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. For a discussion of the interplay between the Compact
Clause and multi-state agreements to address the effects of climate change, see generally Katie
Maxwell, Comment, Multi-State Environmental Agreements: Constitutional Violations or Legiti-
mate State Coordination? 15 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 355 (2007); Michael S. Smith, Note, Murky
Precedent Meets Hazy Air: The Compact Clause and Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 387 (2007).
17. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See generally Kirk Junker, Conven-
tional Wisdom, De-Emption and Uncooperative Federalism in International Environmental Agree-
ments, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 93 (2005) (discussing the Treaty Clauses, states' rights, and
international environmental agreements). For broader commentary on international agreements and
federalism, see generally Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water's Edge: State Pro-
curement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); Edward T. Swaine, Does
Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003); Edward T. Swaine,
Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127
(2000).
18. For an overview of standing principles raised in climate litigation, see generally Bradford
C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005);
Nigel Cooney, Note, Without a Leg to Stand On: The Merger ofArticle III Standing and the Merits
in Environmental Cases, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 175 (2007).
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Thus, while conceding that federal common law causes of action do not
provide an optimal democratic, economic or societal means to address
the effects of climate change, this article concludes that the political
question doctrine is an unworkable constitutional means for dismissing
climate cases planted in federal common law. The doctrine does not
prevent federal courts from entering this thicket.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE, POLICY, AND THE ROLE OF FEDERAL
COMMON LAW
A lengthy discussion of the root causes and effects of climate
change and attendant policies is beyond the scope of this article. It is,
however, helpful to recapitulate them briefly before describing how fed-
eral common law might apply.
A. Effects of Climate Change
Climate Change is at least somewhat attributable to anthropogenic
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the use and combustion of fossil
fuels.19 Extracted from underground sources derived from the decompo-
sition of plants and animals that lived and died millions of years ago,
fossil fuels (e.g., coal, petroleum, natural gas) have become an indispen-
sable component of life in the western world. We use fossil fuels to pro-
pel our cars, planes and trains; to heat our homes, hospitals, schools and
businesses; to make fabrics, plastics and pharmaceuticals; and to provide
the majority of the power we use to wash our clothes and dishes, keep
the lights on, charge our phones and other electronics, run our computers,
and live our modern lives.
The fossil fuels used to facilitate these activities produce copious
amounts of GHGs. Indeed, over the time it takes for you to read this
article (assuming you are an average reader with above-average pa-
tience), human activity will contribute about another three million tons of
GHGs into the atmosphere, further concentrating GHG levels.
20
19. A comprehensive discussion of the evidence surrounding anthropogenic-induced climate
change is beyond the scope of this article. For this, the reader is referred to Chapter 1 of the Stem
Review from the British government. See generally SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent-reviews/stem-review-economics-climate-change/stern-review-
report.cfin.
20. See Donald A. Brown, The US. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit Global
Warming Commitments, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 741 (2002). Many scientists and policy makers
believe that a doubling of CO2 from preindustrial levels to 560 ppm may be unavoidable in the 21st
century. This is so because the world's political and economic system cannot respond rapidly
enough to make faster changes in some major polluting sources such as gasoline-powered automo-
biles or coal fired power plants. Some environmentalists, however, believe it is still possible to
stabilize GHG at 450 ppm, a level that would limit the temperature increase (in addition to that
[Vol. 85:4
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The increase in GHGs courts calamity by contributing to global cli-
mate change.2' Future generations will be saddled with the costs of "do-
ing nothing. 22 As the Supreme Court recently observed, "[t]he harms
associated with climate change are serious and well recognized, 23 poten-
tially including "a precipitate rise in sea levels by the end of the century,
.. 'irreversible changes to natural ecosystems,' a 'significant reduction
in water storage in winter snowpack in mountainous regions. . . ,' and an
increase in the spread of disease. 24
The effects of climate change are distributed disproportionately. It
is expected to increase precipitation in the Americas, but decrease it in
southern Africa, the Mediterranean and southern Asia.2 5 Relative ground
temperatures are expected to rise faster in the polar regions, particularly
in the Arctic Regions. 6
The manifestations of climate change are difficult to ignore. In-
deed, as former Vice President Al Gore explained when accepting the
Nobel Peace Prize for his extensive work on spreading the news about
the dangers of climate change:
In the last few months, it has been harder and harder to misinterpret
the signs that our world is spinning out of kilter. Major cities in
North and South America, Asia and Australia are nearly out of water
due to massive droughts and melting glaciers. Desperate farmers are
losing their livelihoods. Peoples in the frozen Arctic and on low-
lying Pacific islands are planning evacuations of places they have
long called home. Unprecedented wildfires have forced a half mil-
lion people from their homes in one country and caused a national
emergency that almost brought down the government in another.
Climate refugees have migrated into areas already inhabited by peo-
which has already been caused by human activities) to 1.5 to 2°F during the next 100 years. Virtu-
ally nobody believes that it is possible to stabilize atmospheric concentrations below 450 ppm and
concentrations could continue growing after that if third-world countries do not implement aggres-
sive reduction strategies, even if the most ambitious proposal currently under consideration were
adopted. Id.
21. For a discussion of some of the impacts of climate change, see generally Richard A. Kerr,
Latest Forecast: Stand By for a Warmer, but not Scorching, World, SCIENCE, Apr. 21, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/312/5772/35 Ia; CAMILLE PARMESAN & HECTOR
GALBRAITH, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIENT CHANGE, OBSERVED IMPACTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE U.S. (2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/final_
Obslmpact.pdf. For contemporaneous impacts, see generally Real Climate: Climate Science from
Climate Scientists, http://www.realclimate.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
22. Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurri-
canes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 Loy. L. REV. 1127, 1127, 1179
(2006).
23. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1455 (2007).
24. Id. at 1456 (quoting declaration of Michael MacCracken, former Executive Director, U.S.
Global Change Research Program).
25. This harm also translates into economic costs. See Gateway to the United Nation's Sys-
tems on Climate Change, Climate Change at a Glance,
http://www.un.org/climatechange/background/ataglance.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
26. See Gateway to the United Nation's Systems on Climate Change, supra note 25.
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pie with different cultures, religions, and traditions, increasing the
potential for conflict. Stronger storms in the Pacific and Atlantic
have threatened whole cities. Millions have been displaced by mas-
sive flooding in South Asia, Mexico, and 18 countries in Africa. As
temperature extremes have increased, tens of thousands have lost
their lives. We are recklessly burning and clearing our forests and
driving more and more species into extinction. The very web of life
on which we depend is being ripped and frayed.
27
The status quo will increase GHG emissions about two percent per
annum, resulting in a global increase of at least two to three degrees Cel-
sius by 2100.28 It will also likely bring about abrupt climate change.
This includes ice sheet disintegration, and regional climate disruptions.
29
Furthermore, it is likely to result in significant species loss because iso-
therm displacement due to climate change moves more rapidly than
plants and animals can migrate. 30  The domestic effects of climate
change include extreme weather events and more significant droughts,
floods, and fires. 31 States in the United States have already reported ris-
ing sea levels, flooding, snowfall reductions, and coastal erosion.32 They
are also left with health care and other costs in the aftermath.33
B. Policy Responses
A conspicuous lack of cohesive federal action to regulate green-
house gas emissions has invited piecemeal approaches to climate change
in the U.S.3 4  In 1992, the United States joined the U.N. Framework
Convention on Global Climate Change (UNFCC). In 1997, it served as a
signatory to the Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change. Yet subse-
quently the political branches and federal agencies have said much and
done relatively little to address climate change.
27. Al Gore, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 2007), available at
http://nobelprize.orglnobel prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lectureen.html.
28. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 340 (D.
Vt. 2007); see also Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal.
2007), 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (companion case challenging California standards);
Lincoln Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 1:06-cv-00070-T-LDA (filed Feb. 13, 2006) (same for Rhode
Island).
29. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
30. Id. at 340-41.
31. See, e.g., id. at 341. Hansen Aff., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v.
Crombie, Nos. 2:05-CV-302, 2:05-CV-304, 2006 WL 4761053, at 65 (D. Vt. Aug. 14, 2006).
32. See, e.g., GUIDO FRANCO, CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2005), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005- 103/CEC-500-2005-103-SD.PDF;
Washington State, Department of Ecology, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/effects.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2008).
33. See, Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Princi-
ple, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 445-60 (2008).
34. Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piece-
meal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
369, 372 (2006).
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First, Congress. While many federal representatives lend their
name to pending climate legislation, Congress has yet to enact any of it.
35
The U.S. Senate has yet to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. With Australia's
late 2007 ratification of the Protocol, 36 this leaves the U.S. with the dubi-
ous distinction of being the only major industrialized country in the
world that has not done so. 37 Moreover, Congress has not allocated or
appropriated funds to pay for the direct effects of climate change. These
include shoreline loss, property damage, crop diminution, and personal
health and welfare loss and injuries.
Next, the Executive. The President has done little to enter the cli-
mate change fray other than promote volunteerism. While the Bush Ad-
ministration observes that global climate change is a "complex and im-
portant issue," 38 it regularly resists federal measures to regulate GHG
emissions. When countries from around the globe met in Bali in the fall
of 2007 to discuss ways to reduce GHG emissions, primarily as a means
of protecting the poor and politically powerless around the globe,39 the
White House announced that it would not agree to reduce U.S. green-
house gas emissions.4 °
The Fourth Branch has fared no better. Federal agencies have
adopted a "wait and see" approach exalting voluntary community action.
While the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allows that
"human-induced warming and associated sea level rises are expected to
continue through the 21st century," 41 it has avoided opportunities to
regulate GHG emissions under available legislative vehicles, such as the
Clean Air Act, despite prodding by the U.S. Supreme Court.42 It has also
failed to recommend legislative action.
Furthermore, EPA has thwarted innovative state measures to ad-
dress climate change. For example, on December 19, 2007, EPA Chief
Administrator Johnson denied the State of California's petition 43 to regu-
35. See, e.g., America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007), available
at http://usclimatenetwork.org/federal/lieberman-warner-bill/ACSA.pdf; Low Carbon Economy Act
of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong.
(2007).
36. Australia Raties Kyoto Protocol, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/asia/03rudd-wire.htmJ.
37. Abate, supra note 34, at 370-72.
38. The White House, Council on Environmental Quality,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/global-change.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
39. Peter Gelling, Focus of Climate Talks Shifts to Helping Poor Countries Cope, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at A31.
40. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 14, at 10662.
41. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CHAPTER 6, IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION 1,
available at http://yosernite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BNQ7Z/
$File/ch6.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
42. See Robert S. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the Institutional Design
of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 196, 201-02 (2008).
43. California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, Request for a Clean
Air Act Section 209(b) Waiver Preemption for California's Adopted and Amended New Motor
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late greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles. 44 In a curious
call,45 EPA maintains that California has failed to demonstrate the "com-
pelling and extraordinary circumstances" needed to enact such regula-
tions. 46 California immediately objected4 7 and has filed suit,4 8 joined by
fifteen other states, 49 to reverse the EPA's ruling. 50  EPA then waited
another three months before formally rejecting the State of California's
request to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles.
51
The vacuum left by the lack of coherent federal action has resulted
in an ad-hoc "dynamic federalism." 52 Think of it as the Wild West meets
political climate science, where sub global regulation runs amok.
53
Alas, the states. States frustrated with the lack of action by the
elected federal branches have turned to other mechanisms to address
climate change.54 Take your pick. State measures include gubernatorial
action,55 legislation, regulation,56 and multistate climate change com-
Vehicle Regulations and Incorporated Test Procedures to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Support Document, December 21, 2005.
44. Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gover-
nor, California, denying Section 209(b) waiver preemption (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf.
45. Glicksman, supra note 22, at 201-02.
46. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 44.
47. Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, California, and 13 Other Governors to
Stephen L. Johnson, Adminstrator, EPA, regarding U.S. EPA's denial of California's tailpipe emis-
sions waiver request (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/8596/ ("The federal
government, with this unprecedented action, is ignoring the rights of states, as well as the will of
more than one hundred million people across the U.S.").
48. See California v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 2, 2008).
49. Fifteen states have joined the suit, on the basis of § 177. Keith Richburg, California Sues
EPA Over Emissions Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2008, at A02, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/02/AR2008010202833.html.
50. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Announces EPA Suit Filed to Reverse
Waiver Denial, available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/8400/ (suit filed in Ninth Circuit on
January 2, 2008); California Sues EPA over Greenhouse Gas Rules, MSNBC, Jan. 2, 2008, available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22474944/ (arguing EPA ignored legal requirements of CAA).
51. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards: Notice of Decision Denying
a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Green-
house Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 26, 2008).
52. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. 159, 177 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Com-
mons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 EcOL. L.Q. 183, 194, 196-97 (2005).
54. For discussions of recent state efforts, see Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism,
and the Constitution 2-3 (U.C. Berkeley Public Law Research, Paper No. 1081664, 2008), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract-1081664; Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate
Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 46 (2007).
55. Sarah Krakoff, Essay: Arnold Schwarzenegger and Our Common Future, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 925, 925 (2005).
56. See Farber, supra note 54, at 3 1. Professor Farber states:
Courts should not be quick to invalidate state climate regulations, whether or not Con-
gress has legislated. It is much more likely that society will be too timid in responding to
climate change than that it will go too far; any fear of over-regulation by states would be
largely misplaced. The courts should consequently content themselves with policing
against the most obvious potential flaws in state legislation.
Id. at4.
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pacts.57 Last, states have looked to federal courts for help, summoning
the federal common law.
C. Role of Federal Common Law
Impatient with the general lack of federal action,58 and concerned
about the effects of climate change, states representing nearly one-half of
the nation's population and individuals have brought a significant
amount of litigation to address climate change.5 9 Aiming for compensa-
tion,60 or pushing technological responses, states, communities and indi-
viduals have turned to the federal common law of public nuisance.61
Public nuisance law involves an "unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public. 62 Public nuisance cases are gener-
ally brought by public entities, such as states as parens patriae, to protect
state resources and the interests of a state's citizens.
The theory is relatively straightforward. The linchpin of a federal
public nuisance cause of action is establishing that the interference is
"unreasonable" to public health or welfare.63  Causation for public nui-
sance can be collective. Any defendant that plays a substantial role in
57. Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 65 (2005); Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative from the Governors of the States of CT, DE, ME, NH, NJ, NY, and VT
(Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou-final 12 20_05.pdf (capping GHGs
from, and agreeing to cooperate with carbon markets for, electric utilities).
58. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Muta-
tion of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 719, 778 (2006).
59. See ROBERT MELTZ, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GROWING PHENOMENON 5, 14,
18, 22 (2007), available at www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05jan/RL32764.pdf; see also
JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS: A LITIGATION UPDATE 1 (2006), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/documents/GWL Report.pdf.
60. See Daniel Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 1605, 1613-14 (2007). In advancing ideas about how to compensate for climate change, Pro-
fessor Farber writes:
My purpose is not to offer a fully matured blueprint for compensation. It is to put some
basic ideas on the table and to suggest that at least part of the compensation issue is rela-
tively manageable. In the end, the decision of whether to compensate will be driven
largely by political decision makers rather than by courts or, even less likely, by scholars.
Whether a large-scale compensation plan will ever be adopted, let alone when such a step
might be taken, remains unclear. Even at this early stage, however, it is useful to imagine
the outlines of a compensation scheme. Doing so may help focus the debate on whether
or not to compensate, and it will provide a useful head start on actual programmatic de-
sign if the decision is ultimately made to provide compensation.
Id. at 1608.
61. See Kaswan, supra note 54, at 52 ("I suggest that the courts remain a vital forum for
addressing climate change, particularly in the absence of comprehensive action by the other branches
of government."). For other potential remedies, see Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen,
Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10114, 10127 (2008).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
63. See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
293, 328-30 (2005) (explaining how courts balance equities in public nuisance cases); Matthew F.
Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American
Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 448-49 (2005) (discussion of elements of public
nuisance cause of action).
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causing the nuisance can be liable. 64 A plaintiffs ability to demonstrate
causation will depend upon the significance of each defendant's contri-
butions. When the harm is indivisible, liability for public nuisance is
joint and several.65 In the climate context, it is plausible to find that a
defendant is a significant contributor to an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public and allocate responsibility for
equitable or legal relief.
66
Federal common law for public nuisance has a long and storied his-
tory of helping to fill the interstitial regulatory gaps left by diluted or
dilatory federal legislative and executive responses. There is thus a rich
history of cases applying federal common law to transboundary pollution
in the face of insufficient federal regulation.67 The more venerated, if not
necessarily household name cases, include Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
68
and Missouri v. Illinois69 (water pollution), New Jersey v. New York7"
(solid waste), and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.71 (air pollution).
Federal common law holds potential for addressing the effects of
climate change, even if it is "second best" to other legislative and judicial
responses. As Professor Kaswan notes:
[T]he common law provides a legal remedy for a serious injury that
the political branches have failed to provide. Common law actions
could also create political pressure for needed congressional action.
Moreover, the climate change public nuisance cases brought to date
do not pose as great a risk of piecemeal and inconsistent standards as
common law cases sometimes pose. The courts' relative institutional
competence, from both a technical and a political perspective, is a
concern, and one that suggests that a legislative approach would ul-
timately be preferable. Nonetheless, in the absence of a legislative
response, the common law's "second best" is better than nothing.
72
Since the nation's founding the common law has afforded the
means for states and citizens to stop or curtail harmful and insufficiently-
regulated activities and to recover demonstrable personal and property
damages. Hence states and citizens have turned to the federal common
law to address unreasonable effects of cigarettes, weapons, insurance
64. Pawa & Krass, supra note 63, at 450-55 (discussing liability of defendants whose contri-
butions alone would not have created the nuisance).
65. David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 31 (2003).
66. See id. at 27.
67. Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
403,421 (1974).
68. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
69. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
70. 284 U.S. 585 (1931).
71. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
72. Kaswan, supra note 54, at 106.
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fraud and price gouging, as well as for the transboundary effects of air
emissions, water pollution and contamination of land and drinking water.
Federal common law provides a means for addressing the impacts
of climate change in three ways. First, it offers the opportunity to estab-
lish compliance schedules to require the installation of technology that
might be used to reduce emissions of GHGs. Second, it provides a basis
for compensation for personal or property damage.73 Third, it provides a
means for paying the costs of monitoring, protecting, restoring, or pro-
74
viding substitutes for existing resources.
Federal common law is specially suited to remedy the personal and
property parade of climate change horribles. When Congress inevitably
enters the fray and enacts pervasive climate legislation, it is unlikely to
set aside a remedial fund to pay states, cities and citizens who will absorb
the externalized costs of GHG emissions of the auto, industrial and en-
ergy sectors. The tea leaves suggest that when Congress acts it is
unlikely to do so in a fashion that gives states and citizens much latitude
in controlling measures or damages. Rather, it is more likely to install a
"cap and trade" market in which regulated entities are allocated and can
acquire and trade emission credits and perhaps enjoy partial or full im-
munity from private law causes of action, if not liability limits for com-
pensatory or punitive damages. It is also likely that Congress will ex-
plicitly if not implicitly preempt federal common law causes of action for
injunctive relief, and maybe for damages too. It may also preempt state
common law causes of action in the same regard.
There is little doubt that federal common law is hardly the optimal
option for addressing climate change. Climate change is a global issue
with salient national impacts. The elected branches are well suited to
weigh the tough policy choices about energy, conservation, transporta-
tion, and a host of other factors. The states no doubt have a role in im-
plementing climate policy in a grand dance of cooperative federalism.
Yet equally doubtful is the elected branches' capability to provide
the legislative and tactical relief due states and individuals for the ad-
verse effects of climate change. The effects of climate change come with
a price tag, one that is regressive for states and citizens, including those
on the political and economic margins of society. 75 Adverse effects in-
clude ice-melt sea level rise that would inundate the East Coast of the
73. For a discussion of a possible framework for compensating the victims of climate change,
see generally Farber, supra note 54.
74. Id. at 1655.
75. See also Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on
Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1624 (2007); Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and
Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1677 (2007).
See generally Alice Kaswan, supra note 54 (providing an overview of the positive and negative
environmental justice implications of a variety of the most significant emerging climate change
policies, including cap and trade).
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U.S., including most of Florida and most urban centers heavily populated
by racial and ethnic minorities.
76
The price tag for climate change is daunting. Massachusetts alone
concludes that climate change will cost its taxpayers $1.8 billion annu-
ally due to increased flooding, loss of shoreline, and water borne dis-
eases. 77 Climate change will also place some states at a competitive dis-
advantage.78 Hence states, their instruments, and individuals are left
wondering why they should be left to pay for climate change.79
Almost as last resort then they have enlisted the federal judiciary to
help fashion relief under the federal common law. These cases naturally
involve a complex intersection of foreign, federal and state law and pol-
icy. They also raise myriad constitutional questions, including whether
the "political question doctrine" prevents federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over climate cases, as discussed in Part II. This article con-
cludes it does not.
II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
While the Constitution does not admit of a field of "political ques-
tions" beyond the reach of the federal judiciary, the Supreme Court has
concluded that matters that are demonstrably committed to a coordinate
branch of government, or otherwise imprudent for judicial service, are
not justiciable.8°
Chief Justice Marshall's observations serve as the fountainhead of
the doctrine. In Marbury v. Madison,81 he wrote that there are "irksome"
and "delicate" questions that are inherently political and out of reach to
the federal judiciary: "Questions, in their nature political or which are,
by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be
made to this court., 82 Thus, he anticipated two strands of cases that en-
gender judicial forbearance, and with them, the framework of the politi-
cal question doctrine: first, those that are constitutionally or statutorily
76. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 340 (D.
Vt. 2007).
77. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
78. See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Romhn & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source
Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVT. L.J. 1, 45 (2005) (state litigation "is a flexible
tool for overcoming regulatory inertia at the federal level").
79. See Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay?, 23 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 1, 2-3 (2007). Professor Farber says:
Most importantly, we should start thinking about cost allocation now because very soon
the world is going to start doing so. As the realization sinks in that climate change will
cause billions of dollars of harm even if we do everything feasible to cut back on emis-
sions, the people who are directly harmed are going to start wondering whether they
alone should bear the costs.
Id. at4.
80. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962).
81. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
82. Id. at 169-70.
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committed to the executive branch and second, those that as a matter of
prudence should be avoided because they are political "in their nature."
83
Modem political question jurisprudence inquires as to "whether the
duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially deter-
mined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially
molded., 84 In deciding whether to apply the doctrine, courts must "ana-
lyze representative cases and . . . infer from them . . . analytical
threads. 85 Such threads expose six "formulations" of cases that are not
suitable for judicial identification, determination or molding:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the im-
possibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of the
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; or (5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question.
86
The formulations are "probably listed in descending order of both
importance and certainty. ' 87 Yet dismissal is warranted only if one ofthese formulations is "inextricable" from the case.88
Baker v. Carr's formulations reveal the two strands of the political
question doctrine. The first strand-which encompasses the first formu-
lation-is textual, and asks whether commitment of the issue to an
elected branch is "[p]rominent on the surface." 89 The second strand-
which includes formulations (2) through (6)-is prudential, and applies
in the absence of a textual commitment but when there are functional
reasons for judicial restraint.
90
The political question doctrine has proven one of "limited applica-
tion."91 Applying the doctrine involves "a delicate exercise in constitu-
tional interpretation" to be conducted on a "case-by-case inquiry. '92 It is
to be used sparingly in the context of demonstrable "political questions"
devoted to the elected branches, not simply to cases that involve political
83. Id. at 170.
84. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198.
85. Id. at 211.
86. Id. at 217.
87. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
88. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (E.D. La.
2006).
92. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
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issues. 93 To be sure, the Court has used the doctrine only a half a dozen
times in more than two centuries. Traditional questions into which
courts "ought not enter the political thicket ' 94 include political appor-
tionment and gerrymandering,9 impeachment, 96 constitutional amend-
ments,97 and treaty abrogation.98
Now to this list add climate change. Somewhat surprisingly, federal
courts have recently extended the doctrine in dismissing federal common
law causes of action by states and citizens to address the effects of cli-
mate change. They have done so under both the textual and prudential
prongs of the doctrine. As discussed in Parts III and IV, this is a wrong
turn for the doctrine.
III. WHY CLIMATE CASES ARE NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY COMMITTED
The first prong of modem political question doctrine inquires as to
whether the issue involves a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."99 It is the
"clearest statement of the six,"' 00 and registers the "dominant considera-
tion in any political question inquiry." 101 This Part explains why climate
cases are not textually committed to a coordinate branch of government.
It begins with explaining the types of issues that are subject to this prong
of the doctrine, before moving on to how some courts have misapplied it
in climate cases.
A. General Application
The Court has held matters "constutitionally committed" when they
are expressly addressed by the Constitution. This includes federal con-
gressional districting, foreign relations, impeachment of federal officers
and constitutional amendments. Congressional districting provides per-
haps the most salient use of this prong of the doctrine. For example, in
Colegrove v. Green,10 2 the plaintiffs argued that Illinois' congressional
districting scheme violated the Republican Guarantee Clause because it
did not apportion voting districts equally, which had the effect of accen-
tuating the influence of rural voting districts and diluting that of urban
districts inhabited predominantly by racial minorities. The Court elected
to remain "aloof," finding apportionment constitutionally committed to
93. Id. at 217.
94. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
95. Id.; Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
96. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
97. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
98. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
99. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
100. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (E.D. La. 2006).
101. Id. (quoting Saldano v. O'Connell, 322 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Nixon, 506
U.S. at 252-53 (Souter, J., concurring))).
102. 328 U.S. 549, 550 (1946).
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the House of Representatives:10 3 "[T]he Constitution has conferred upon
Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in
the popular House [of Representatives]."' 1 4 Thus, the Court reasoned
that "[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket."'
0 5
Foreign relations, constitutionally committed to the elected
branches, are also subject to the political question doctrine. For example,
the Court has also found that presidential abrogation of existing treaties
falls under the political question doctrine. In Goldwater v. Carter, the
Court in a plurality opinion ruled that the issue of whether the President
could terminate a treaty unilaterally without Senate involvement is non-
justiciable because "it involves the authority of the President in the con-
duct of our country's foreign relations."'' 0 6 The Court reasoned it should
refrain when the dispute is "between coequal branches of our Govern-
ment, each of which has resources available to protect and assert its in-
terests, resources not available to private litigants outside the judicial
forum.'
107
The Court has also concluded that the impeachment process is con-
stitutionally committed to the elected branches. In Nixon v. United
States,10 8 a federal judge challenged his impeachment conviction by the
Senate, claiming that the Constitution afforded him a trial before the full
Senate instead of a committee of the Senate. Former federal judge Wal-
ter Nixon argued that while the Constitution provides an elaborate proc-
ess for impeachment and conviction of federal officers for "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,"' 9 it is the Senate-
and not a committee of the Senate-that has the "sole Power to try all
Impeachments."
0
The Court declined to engage the issues under the political question
doctrine. It held that impeachment matters are constitutionally commit-
ted to the elected branches: "judicial review would be inconsistent with
the Framers' insistence that our system be one of checks and bal-
ances."' 1 It also found it would be imprudent to impose judicial stan-
dards on the impeachment process: "In addition to the textual commit-
ment argument, we are persuaded that the lack of finality and the diffi-
culty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability."
' 12
103. Id. at 552-53 ("[T]he petitioners ask of this Court what is beyond its competence to
grant.... [T]his controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active relations
with party contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof.").
104. Id. at 554.
105. Id. at 556.
106. 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 1004.
108. 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
109. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
110. Id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
111. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 234-35.
112. ld at 236.
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Finally, the Court has held that questions surrounding the constitu-
tional amendment process are constitutionally committed. In Coleman v.
Miller,113 it ruled that challenges to the duration for holding open pro-
posed amendments to the Constitution raise a non-justicable political
question because the Constitution commits the amendment process to
Congress. 14 It reasoned that judicial involvement in the matter would
upend "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments."
'"15
B. Application in Climate Cases
The leading case finding there to be a "textually demonstrable con-
stitutional commitment" of climate change issues to a coordinate politi-
cal department is California v. General Motors Corp.116 In that case, the
State of California brought a federal and state common law causes of
action against General Motors, Toyota, Ford, Honda, DaimlerChrysler,
and Nissan, seeking damages for "past and ongoing contributions to
global warming, a public nuisance."'"1 7 California claimed that the de-
fendants produce more than 20 percent of CO 2 emissions in the United
States, and 30 percent of all CO2 emissions in California."
8  It com-
plained that it has incurred substantial cost as a result of climate changes
due to decreased snowfall and increased erosion, flooding and wild-
fires. 119 It asked that the court assess damages to defray the costs associ-
ated with these effects.
The court found the first prong of the Baker v. Carr test precluded
judicial review. It enlisted Congress' enumerated power over interstate
commerce, and the President and the Senate's complementary roles over
foreign policy as evidence of a constitutional commitment of climate
issues to the elected branches. 120 It observed that the Constitution gives
Congress authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 21 Thus, it con-
cluded, "concerns raised by the potential ramifications of a judicial deci-
sion on global warming in this case would sufficiently encroach upon
113. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
114. Id. at 452-55; see also U.S. CONST. art. V.
115. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962). For opposing points of view as to how the
political question doctrine applies to the constitutional amendment process, compare Laurence H.
Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 433, 433-36 (1983), with Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Re-
thinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REv. 386, 387 (1983).
116. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
117. Second Amended Compl. at 2, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ,
2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
118. Id. 40.
119. Id. 1.
120. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
121. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *13; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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interstate commerce, to cause the Court to pause before delving into such
areas so constitutionally committed to Congress." 122
Pause it did. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims in-
volved areas textually committed to Congress under the Commerce
Clause. It reasoned that a state's control over interstate markets for
automobiles is "subordinate to the federal power over interstate com-
merce."1
23
It also expressed a concern tantamount that under the dormant
Commerce Clause, insofar as states are "constrained by the need to re-
spect the interests of other States."' 124 The court was uncomfortable with
the notion of fashioning a remedy that could implicate commerce in
other states:
[R]ecognizing such a new and unprecedented federal common law
nuisance claim for damages would likely have commerce implica-
tions in other States by potentially exposing automakers, utility com-
panies, and other industries to damages flowing from a new judi-
cially-created tort for doing nothing more than lawfully engaging in
their respective spheres of commerce within those States. 1
25
Next, it held climate issues constitutionally committed to the "for-
eign policy" roles of the coordinate branches because they have
"weighed in" on the issue of climate change. 126 The court maintained
that inaction by the coordinate branches is sufficient to constitute "for-
eign policy determinations regarding the United States' role in the inter-
national concern about global warming.' ' 127 It concluded that congres-
sional inaction signaled a deliberate decision "to refrain from any unilat-
eral commitment to reducing [GHG] emissions domestically unless de-
veloping nations make a reciprocal commitment," and that the President
has reached the same result because, according to EPA, unilateral domes-
tic action "would impede that diplomatic objective.' 128 Thus, the court
concluded, plaintiffs' federal question common law raised a non-
justiciable political question.
29
Another court facing similar issues declined to find any constitu-
tional commitment of climate issues to the coordinate branches. It none-
theless used the second prong of the political question doctrine to dismiss
the lawsuit, as discussed below in Part IV. In Connecticut v. American
122. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *14.
123. Id. at* 13.
124. Id. (citing Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
194-96 (1824)).
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Electric Power Co., Inc., 130 a collection of states and private conservation
organizations sued the nation's five largest emitters of carbon dioxide
under federal common law and state public nuisance law to redress the
effects of climate change. 31 The states claimed to have brought the suit
for injunctive relief to address, inter alia, "irreparable harm" to the
health, safety and well-being of their 77 million citizens.'32 Plaintiffs
claimed that the power companies' annual emissions of 650 million tons
of carbon dioxide-which constitute roughly "one-quarter of the U.S. []
power sector's [CO 2] emissions" and 10 percent of global emissions by
humans-contribute to global climate change by trapping atmospheric
heat. 133 Accordingly, plaintiffs asked the court to "enjoin[] each of the
Defendants to abate its contribution to the nuisance by capping its emis-
sions of carbon dioxide and then reducing those emissions by a specified
percentage each year for at least a decade."' 34 It also asked that the court
"assess and measure available alternative energy resources," and recon-
cile its relief with U.S. foreign and domestic policy.
135
As criticized in Part IV below, while the court held that the political
question doctrine rendered the case non-justiciable, it did not do so be-
cause it found any constitutional commitment of the issue to the elected
branches. Instead, it applied the prudential prong of the doctrine, finding
it impossible to decide the case without an initial policy determination
from the elected branches. Even though the elected branches lack a co-
gent climate policy, the court reasoned that "deliberate inactions"' 36 is
informed by issues of national security, the environment, and foreign
policy, which counsel non-interference by the judicial branch.
137
C. Criticism of Application ofBaker's Textual Formulation in Climate
Cases
The court's application of the first prong of the political question
doctrine to foreclose review in California v. General Motors Corp. is
incorrect for two reasons.
First, there is no "textual commitment" of climate issues to the
elected branches. Simply, for this prong to apply, the commitment must
be "textual," not inferential. The Constitution must textually address the
matter at hand. It does not. Thus, this prong does not apply. While cli-
130. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The defendants are the American Electric Power
Company, the Southern Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy and Cinergy Cor-
poration.
131. Id. at 267. The plaintiffs included California, Connecticut, Iowa, New York, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the City of New York. Id.
132. Id. at 268.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 270.
135. Id. at 272.
136. Id. at 273.
137. Id. at 274.
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mate cases have political dimensions, it bears repeating Justice Bren-
nan's instruction from Baker v. Carr that "political cases" are not "politi-
cal questions" cordoned off from judicial review.
Second, the precedent that informs use of this prong is inapposite to
climate cases. Unlike the Constitution's specific consignment of con-
gressional districting to Congress under the Guaranty Clause in Cole-
grove, the process for Presidential negotiation and Senate ratification of
treaties under the Treaty Clause in Goldwater v. Carter, the process for
Senate conviction of impeachable offenses under the Impeachment
Clauses in U.S. v. Nixon, and the process for amending the U.S. Constitu-
tion under Article V in Coleman v. Miller, the Constitution does not as-
sign climate issues to either political branch.
To be sure, a federal court applied this reasoning in concluding
there is a lack of a textual constitutional commitment to the coordinate
branches for addressing a related, complex environmental concern with
political dimensions. In Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,
138
the plaintiffs alleged that defendants' network of nearly 10,000 miles of
petroleum pipelines in south Louisiana so altered the hydrology and
physiology of more than one million acres of marshlands that it deprived
inland communities "of their natural protection from hurricane winds and
accompanying storm surge," thereby exacerbating the adverse affects of
Hurricane Katrina and resulting in personal injury, death, and property
damage. 139 Defendants argued that the political question doctrine de-
prived the court of jurisdiction to hear the claims.
1 40
The court rejected the idea that there might be a commitment of the
claims to the elected branches in the text of the Constitution: "Here, the
defendants do not contend, and the Court does not find, that there is a
textually demonstrable commitment of coastal erosion questions to a
coordinate political department.'
4 1
IV. WHY CLIMATE CASES ARE NOT PRUDENTIALLY COMMITTED
The second prong of the Baker v. Carr formulation inquires as to
whether, in the absence of a constitutional commitment of an issue to an
elected branch, federal courts ought to exercise restraint as a matter of
political comity and prudence. In particular, the second prong holds that
a matter is not justiciable if it engenders (1) a "lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards," (2) an "impossibility of deciding the
case without an initial policy determination of the kind clearly for nonju-
dicial discretion," (3) an impossibility of a court's undertaking independ-
138. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (2006).
139. Id. at 679-80.
140. Id. at 680.
141. Id. at 682.
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ent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of the government," (4) an "unusual need for unquestioning
adherence" to a political decision made by the elected branches, or (5)
"the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements"
by the coordinate branches. 42 Judicial treatment in the climate context
has focused on the first two of these, that is, the existence of standards
and the need for antecedent policy determination by the elected branches.
A. Existence of Judicially Discoverable/Manageable Standards
1. Standard
The lack of constitutionally judicially discoverable and manageable
standards has served to thwart judicial involvement in other contexts in
which neither the Constitution nor the courts have developed standards,
including political gerrymandering, naturalization and military policies.
For example, the Court has held that claims of malapportionment of
state legislative districts are justiciable due to the existence of judicially-
established standards construing the Equal Protection Clause. In the
fountainhead case of Baker v. Carr, voters in Tennessee complained that
the malapportionment of the Tennessee General Assembly violated the
Equal Protection Clause "by virtue of the debasement of their votes.'
143
Even though the Tennessee Constitution allocated representation in the
General Assembly on the basis of population, the assembly had not re-
apportioned its districts since 1901, despite a dramatic population shift
from rural to urban centers amply populated by racial and ethnic minori-
ties. The plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin further elections until dis-
tricts could be reapportioned "by mathematical application of the Ten-
nessee constitutional formulae" to match U.S. Census figures. 44 Follow-
ing Colegrove, the lower court declined to enter the political thicket.
145
In reversing, the Supreme Court distinguished Colegrove, noting
that the Republican Guarantee Clause applies to apportionment of fed-
eral-not state-legislative districts: "this challenge to an apportionment
presents no nonjusticiable 'political question."",146 That the matter in-
volves a political process is immaterial: "[T]he mere fact that the suit
seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political
question. Such an objection 'is little more than a play upon words."
14 7
In considering the "contours" of the doctrine, the court observed that "it
is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of
142. Id. at 680.
143. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 188 (1962).
144. Id. at 195.
145. Id. at 196-97.
146. Id. at 209.
147. Id.
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the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to
the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.""10
48
The Court has held that challenges to disproportionate apportioning
of federal congressional districts under the Guaranty Clause are judi-
cially unmanageable. 49 In Luther v. Borden,150 two competing groups
laid claim to being the rightful government of the State of Rhode Island
following a disputed statewide election. In finding the challenge to the
election results non-justiciable, the Court held that the "Guaranty Clause
is not a repository of judicially manageable standards
.. to identify a State's lawful government.'
15' In Vieth v. Jubelirer,5
a plurality of the Court rejected a claim of political gerrymandering due
to the lack of any "judicially discernible and manageable standards" to
determine what would constitute constitutionally equitable voting dis-
tricts.
Furthermore, lower courts have also relied on the lack of "any" ju-
dicial standards in dismissing cases under the political question doctrine.
Some circuit courts have concluded that state challenges under the Natu-
ralization Clause 153 to federal immigration programs are non-justiciable
due to the lack of standards for assessing the constitutionality of immi-
gration policies.154 Others have held that the lack of judicially discover-
able standards renders challenges to military policies unreviewable, in-
cluding those involving military aid' 55 and action, 5 6 and deployment of
weapons. 157
2. Application in Climate Cases
The court in California v. General Motors Corp. incorrectly in-
voked the first component of the prudential prong of the political ques-
tion to dismisss plaintiffs' federal public nuisance claims, holding that
there is a lack of applicable judicially discoverable or manageable stan-
dards. Plaintiffs argued that a long lineage of federal common law
causes of action in environmental pollution cases well supplied judicially
discoverable standards. 158 The plaintiffs portrayed the case as one of
148. Id at 210.
149. The Guaranty Clause reads: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
150. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
151. Baker, 369 U.S. at 223.
152. 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2005).
153. The Clause gives Congress the authority "to establish [a] uniform rule of Naturalization."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
154. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997).
155. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
156. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
157. See, e.g., Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
158. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Sep. 17, 2007).
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"simple nuisance" well suited for traditional principles of tort law.1 59
Thus, plaintiffs contended that courts, rather than legislative bodies, are
better equipped to decide whether defendants' actions constitute an "un-
reasonable interference with a right common to the general public."'
160
Moreover, plaintiffs argued that the court is better equipped to reach the
merits and mete relief than the elected branches. 161
The court was unconvinced. It found inapposite a line of cases dat-
ing back 170 years based on differences in remedy, legal framework and
circumstances. First, the court found the cases inherently distinguishable
because the remedy requested in each was for "equitable remedies to
enjoin or abate the nuisance," and not legal relief.162 Second, it found a
"legal framework" lacking, insofar as the court "is left without guidance
in determining what is an unreasonable contribution to the sum of carbon
dioxide ... or in determining who should bear the costs....,, 63 Third, it
found the prior cases inapplicable "because none of the pollution-as-
public-nuisance cases implicates a comparable number of national and
international policy issues."'164 Fourth, it found the "multiple worldwide
sources of atmospheric warming across myriad industries and multiple
countries" made the prior cases distinguishable. 65 Instead, it determined
that the prior cases "involve primarily issues of local concern involving a
state or public entity seeking equitable relief from a source-certain nui-
sance in a neighboring state."'166 Thus the court concluded that it "is left
without a manageable method of discerning the entities that are creating
and contributing to the alleged nuisance."' 167 Last, it seemed resigned
that the issue of allocating responsibility is simply beyond judicial com-
petence "given the myriad sources of global [GHGs] and the
'[s]ubstantial scientific uncertainties [that] limit [the] ability to... sepa-
rate out those changes resulting from natural variability from those that
are directly the result of increases' in human emissions of GHGs.
168
Central to the court's application of the political question doctrine
in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. is that plaintiffs sought
an abatement order to have the court determine how, when and by whom
CO 2 emissions would be reduced. The court felt these tough choices
involving whose ox to gore is best left to the political branches. Left
159. Id.
160. Id. at *8 (quoting In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 332 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981)).
161. Id.






168. Id. at *14 (alteration in original) (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922-02 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
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open was the extent to which federal courts may calculate monetary
damages attributable to C0 2 emissions in a public nuisance action.
Would the result have been any different had the states in Connecti-
cut v. American Electric Power Co. sought monetary damages instead of
injuctive relief, thereby not raising the same social choice issues that so
concerned the court?
The court in California v. General Motors Corp. 169 answered no. In
General Motors, the State of California asked the court "to create a quo-
tient or standard in order to quantify any potential damages that flow
from Defendants' alleged act of contributing thirty percent of Califor-
nia's carbon dioxide emissions., 170 The court dismissed the action, con-
cluding that the political question doctrine precludes the judicial branch
from determining the representative portion of monetary damages for
which defendants are liable for causing and contributing to global cli-
mate change.
The court determined it could not reach a ruling that is "principled,
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.' ' 71 Thus it held judicial
review would be "inconsistent with the Framers' insistence that our sys-
tem be one of checks and balances,"' 172 and because each factor is "inex-
tricable" from plaintiffs' claims, they presented non-justiciable political
questions. 173
3. Criticism of Application of Baker's "Judicial Standards" Formu-
lation to Climate Cases
General Motors' application of the "judicial standards" aspect of
the prudential component of the political question doctrine is incorrect
for two reasons. First, it seems to ignore that two centuries of common
law amply supply judicial standards for deciding whether there is an "un-
reasonable [use or] interference with a right common to the general pub-
lic.' ' 174 As the court noted in Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co.,1 75 that the courts-and not the Constitution or Congress-supply the
standard is immaterial.
Second, whether judicially discoverable and manageable standards
already exist is not dispositive of whether such standards are available.
For example, in Vieth, in which a plurality held that courts cannot fash-
169. Id. at *1.
170. Id. at *8.
171. Id. at * 15 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
172. Id. at *16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power
Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Oswego Barge
Corp., 654 F.2d 327, 333 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981)).
175. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (2006).
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ion standards for deciding whether voting districts are unconstitutionally
apportioned, four Justices believed such standards already exist, 176 while
a fifth refused to agree that all future political gerrymandering cases are
nonjusticiable. 177 Thus, even if no court has yet "fashioned" standards
for deciding how to apportion responsibility for climate, this does not
mean that it cannot and should not be done.
B. Need for Initial Policy Determination
1. Standard
Outside the climate context, the case law is devoid of meaningful
juridical application of this formulation from Baker v. Carr.
2. Application in Climate Cases
Some federal courts have declined to hear climate cases, incorrectly
citing the need for an initial policy determination by the elected
branches. For example, in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,
the defendants contended that having the court "resolve an environ-
mental policy question with sweeping implications for the nation's econ-
omy, its foreign relations, and even potentially its national security,...
put[s] the cart before the horse., 178 It maintained that federal courts
should exercise judicial restraint in "resolving questions of high policy,
which are for the political branches.' 79
The court agreed, holding that that plaintiffs' climate claims raised
"non-justiciable" political questions because they require the court to
make "initial policy determinations" best left to the other political
branches of government. 80 The court found itself paralyzed to address
climate claims due to the "the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.''
It distinguished the "typical" air pollution case under federal com-
mon law. These include Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,182 which
involved balancing between environmental protection and economic
development, factors that drive decisions about the type and timeframe
of pollution control equipment.183 At bottom, the court concluded that
176. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 272.
181. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278).
182. 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907).
183. See id. at 239; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
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the case was sufficiently dissimilar from most air pollution cases as to
render it non-justiciable. 1
84
The court in American Electric Power Co. wanted no part of this
hot potato. It found plaintiffs' allegations "extraordinary," and "patently
political.' 8 5 It noted that the "scope and magnitude of the relief Plain-
tiffs seek reveals the transcendently legislative nature of this litiga-
tion."'1 6 It believed the claims would require the court to balance envi-
ronmental, economic, and "other" foreign policy and national security
interests, without direction from the elected coordinate branches of gov-
ernment. 8 7 The court also agreed with defendants that CO 2 reduction
required coordinated domestic and international action.
88
Thus, the court concluded that it was impossible for it to hear the
claims without an "initial policy determination" by the elected branches
"before a non-elected court can properly adjudicate a global warming
nuisance claim.'
189
Curiously, under "elected branches," the court included the EPA,
which it noted "has been grappling with the proper approach to the issue
of global climate change for years."' 90 As "grappling" proof that the
court should refrain from making an "initial policy determination," it
endorsed the following from EPA: 191
It is hard to imagine any issue in the environmental area having
greater "economic and political significance" than regulation of ac-
tivities that might lead to global climate change. The issue of global
climate change . . . has been discussed extensively during the last
three Presidential campaigns; it is the subject of debate and negotia-
tion in several international bodies; and numerous bills have been in-
troduced in Congress over the last 15 years to address the issue. Uni-
lateral [regulation of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States]
could also weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries
to reduce the [greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies. Un-
avoidably, climate change raises important foreign policy issues, and
it is the President's prerogative to address them. Virtually every sec-
tor of the U.S. economy is either directly or indirectly a source of
[greenhouse gas] emissions, and the countries of the world are in-
volved in scientific, technical, and political-level discussions about
climate change.
184. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
185. Id. at 271 n.6.
186. Id. at 272.
187. Id. at 274.
188. Id. at 273.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citations omitted).
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The court also interpreted congressional silence as tacit acceptance
that the courts ought not get involved:
The explicit statements of Congress and the Executive on the issue of
global climate change in general and their specific refusal to impose
the limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now seek to impose
by judicial fiat confirm that making the "initial policy determina-
tions" addressing global climate change is an undertaking for the po-
litical branches. 
192
Thus, the court concluded that the m6lange of environmental, eco-
nomic, foreign policy and national security implications of the case "pre-
sent non-justiciable political questions that are consigned to the political
branches, not the Judiciary."'
193
The court in General Motors reached the same result for different
reasons. It believed that the CAA's scheme for regulating emissions,
when fused with other federal schemes concerning fuel efficiency, sug-
gests climate cases require an initial policy determination from the
elected branches.
The court started with emissions. Title II of the Clean Air Amend-
ments Act of 1970 (CAA) required that new "light duty vehicles" (essen-
tially passenger cars 194) reduce hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emis-
sions, and then nitrogen oxides, by 90 percent within five and six years,
respectively.' 95 After initially objecting strenuously to the imposition of
emission standards, automobile manufacturers were achieving them by
the 1980s, largely due to the installation of advanced catalytic convert-
ers. 196
The EPA has a preeminent role in establishing tailpipe emission
standards. The EPA may establish tailpipe emission standards for addi-
tional pollutants than those mentioned above for "any air pollutant...
which in [its] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."' 
97
Title II does not leave the business of emission standards solely
with EPA. Unlike most environmental laws, the CAA not only allows
states to implement standards and ensure their achievement, but provides
192. Id. at 274.
193. Id.
194. See Natural Res. Def Council v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 322 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
195. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1690, 1692 (1970).
196. For a helpful discussion of this period, see Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Envi-
ronmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 345-46 (2003); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 492 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting role of catalytic converter technol-
ogy in helping to achieve national air quality standards).
197. 84 Stat. 1676.
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them the capacity to establish standards as well, in a kind of microcosmic
reflection of dual federalism.'
98
Following a statutory scheme that evolved from the advent of the
original Clean Air Act,' 99 the CAA both precludes and invites state tail-
pipe emission standards. Section 209(a) explicitly preempts states from
adopting "any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines. 2 °° Yet section 209(b)
allows California to achieve a "waiver" from federal standards provided
it finds that its own standards "will be, in the aggregate, at least as pro-
tective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards," and
that EPA determines that they are (1) not "arbitrary and capricious" con-
sidering feasibility and costs, (2) not inconsistent with federal tailpipe
emission standards under section 202, and (3) that California needs its
own more stringent standards to meet a local "compelling . .. condi-
tion[]. ' ' 0
Other states may adopt their own tailpipe emission standards, so
long as they are identical to California's standards. Section 177 allows
other states to adopt and enforce standards "identical to" any for which
EPA has granted a waiver to California, as long as the standards are
adopted at least two years prior to the applicable model year.202 This
overlapping regulatory scheme is a compromise "between the states,
which wanted to preserve their traditional role in regulating motor vehi-
cles, and the manufacturers, which wanted to avoid the economic disrup-
tion latent in having to meet fifty-one separate sets of emissions control
requirements. ,,203
In 1999 a group of watchdog and public interest groups petitioned
EPA to engage in rulemaking to set emission standards for GHGs under
Title II of the CAA.2°4 EPA denied the petition in 2003, maintaining that
198. This happened incrementally. Congress's initial foray into regulating vehicle emissions,
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), explicitly recog-
nized the need for, but did little to unseat state primacy concerning motor vehicle licensing and
operation, and did not preempt state efforts respecting emissions. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of
the United States, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation (MVMA 111), 17 F.3d 521, 524-25
(2d Cir. 1994); Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. E.P.A. (MEMA 1), 627 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
199. The Air Quality Act of 1967 set forth the framework for establishing national standards.
Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). Yet it also preserved state author-
ity, such as California had already exercised, to establish more stringent standards, provided it could
show a compelling need and that its standards were consistent with the Act. Id at 501.
200. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(a) (West 2008).
201. § 7543(b).
202. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507 (West 2008). Fourteen states have adopted California's emission
limitations. See generally CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR RESOURCES
BOARD, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: CLIMATE CHANGE EMISSION REDUCTION STANDARDS
FOR VEHICLES (2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ccfaq.pdf.
203. MEM1, 627 F.2d at 1109.
204. Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emission from New Motor Vehicles under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, Control of Emissions
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the Clean Air Act does not authorize it to regulate emissions to address
global climate change and that it has discretion not to regulate based on
policy considerations, including foreign policy.
20 5
This prompted the State of Massachusetts and a litany of mostly
downwind "blue" states and environmental organizations to challenge
EPA's inaction, contending that it improperly exercised its discretion in
denying petition by several states calling for rulemaking to regulate car-
bon dioxide and three other greenhouse gas emissions-methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons-from new motor vehicles under Title II
of the Clean Air Act.206
In Massachusetts v. EPA, °7 the Court disagreed with EPA's bases
for denying the rulemaking petition. The Court decided three issues.
First, that petitioners (namely, Massachusetts) demonstrated standing
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to challenge EPA's inaction.20 8
The Court held that states enjoy "special solicitude" in demonstrating
standing.0 9 Second, the Court held that greenhouse gas emissions con-
stitute an "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act's "capacious definition
of 'air pollutant.' 2 '0 Last, it held that EPA "offered no reasoned expla-
nation" and that it was arbitrary and capricious for the agency to refuse
to decide if these emissions "endanger public health or welfare" due to
policy considerations not listed in the Clean Air Act, mainly foreign pol-
icy.211 Justice Scalia thought the Court should have deferred to EPA in
what he said was a "straightforward administrative law case," and that it
had "no business substituting its own desired outcome for the reasoned
judgment of the [EPA]. 212
The court in General Motors then turned to efficiency. Efficiency
standards for automobiles, known as "corporate average fuel economy"
or "CAFE" standards,21 3 are set under the auspices of the Energy Policy
From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,922-23 (Sept. 8, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.icta.org/doc/ghgpet2.pdf.
The International Center for Technology Assessment (CTA) is a non-profit, bi-partisan
organization committed to providing the public with full assessments and analyses of
technological impacts on society. CTA is devoted to fully exploring the economic, ethi-
cal, social, environmental and political impacts that can result from the applications of
technology or technological systems.
International Center for Technology Assessment, About Us, http://www.icta.org/aboutlindex.cfm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
205. 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 59,933.
206. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007),
207. Id. at 1438. For a captivating account of her role in this case, see Lisa Heinzerling, Cli-
mate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENvTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
208. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453.
209. Id. at 1454-55.
210. Id. at 1462 (majority opinion).
211. Id. at 1462-63.
212. Id. at 1478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir.
1990). See generally Amendment to Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, Pub. L. No.
94-163, § 301, §§ 501-12, 89 Stat. 901, 901-16 (1975).
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and Conservation Act (EPCA), which Congress enacted in response to
the energy crisis of the 1970s.214 EPCA's aim is to "provide for im-
proved energy efficiency of motor vehicles. 215 When Congress enacted
EPCA in 1975, CAFE standards stood at roughly 14 miles per gallon of
gasoline (mpg). The EPCA required CAFE standards achieve 18 mpg by
1978, and further improve to 27.5 mpg by 1985, roughly doubling fuel
efficiency fleet-wide.216 EPCA authorizes the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, and its designee the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA),217 to adopt different standards thereafter.218 Section
32902(f) provides that when "deciding maximum feasible average fuel
economy under this section, [NHTSA] shall consider technological fea-
sibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle stan-
dards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United
States to conserve energy. 219
The average fuel economy standard for passenger automobiles re-
mains at 27.5 mpg, the standard enacted in 1975 and in place since
model year 1985.220 It was not until 2006 that NHTSA set CAFE stan-
dards for light trucks, which run from 2008 to 20 10.22 1 Basically, the
emission standards for light trucks are 22.5, 23.1 and 23.5 for model
years 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. 222 The NHTSA's standards for
light duty trucks are due to expire with the 2010 model year. Unlike the
CAA and emissions, EPCA specifically preempts state fuel efficiency
standards.223
The court in General Motors held that the Clean Air Act's "com-
prehensive state and federal scheme to control air pollution in the United
States," coupled with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's "com-
prehensive response to the energy crisis of the 1970's," when "read in
conjunction with the prevalence of the international and national debate,
and the resulting policy actions and inactions ... would require an initial
214. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975); see also
Gen. Motors, 898 F.2d at 167 (discussing EPCA's legislative history).
215. § 2(5), 89 Stat. 871.
216. § 301, § 502(a)(1), 89 Stat. 901; Gen. Motors, 898 F.2d at 167.
217. Delegation to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator, 49 C.F.R. § 1.50
(2008).
218. See S. REP. No. 94-516, at 119, 153-54 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1956, 1959-60, 1994-95.
219. 49 U.S.C.A. § 32902(f) (West 2008).
220. § 32902(b)(4)(A).
221. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg.
17566 (Apr. 6, 2006) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, and 537).
222. Id. at 17568. "Reformed" standards, which take into account a light truck's wheelbase
and track width, are 22.7, 23.4 and 23.7 mpg for model years 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. Id.
at 17624.
223. 49 U.S.C.A. § 32919(a) (West 2008). Section 32919(a) provides that
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in effect, a State
or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related
to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by
an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.
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policy determination of the type reserved for the political branches of
government., 224  Considering this "legislative landscape," the court
mused that it should not "inject[] itself into the global warming
thicket.
, 225
The court also found support for its holding from the Supreme
Court's standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA.226 EPA argued that
Massachusetts lacked standing, given the relatively dissipated effect of
requiring EPA to act-reducing greenhouse gas emissions by less than
five percent annually at best-and the tenuous connection between cli-
mate change and Massachusetts' costs due to shoreline loss and health
care.
227
On behalf of the Court, Justice Stevens upheld Massachusetts'
standing, finding that states enjoy "special solicitude" in the standing
analysis.228 The majority emphasized the fact "[t]hat these climate-
change risks are 'widely shared' does not minimize Massachusetts' in-
terest in the outcome of this litigation,', 229 suggesting a more commodi-
ous interpretation of the "injury in fact" component of constitutional
standing.
In addition, the majority accorded a similarly capacious treatment of
the causation and redressability components of standing. It concluded
that incremental increases in carbon dioxide emissions as a result of the
EPA's failure to regulate fulfilled the causation element, 230 and with re-
spect to redressability, "[a] reduction in domestic emissions would slow
the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens else-
where."23'
The majority's "special solicitude" veneer for state standing drew a
rebuke from Chief Justice Roberts, who questioned Stevens' "state so-
licitude" standard as an "implicit concession that petitioners cannot es-




The court in General Motors found support from all comers of the
majority's opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA for its determination that the
lack of initial policy precludes climate cases. First, it decided that the
Supreme Court's reasoning that state plaintiffs are entitled to "special
solicitude" in standing analysis supported its political question analysis:
"[Massachusetts v. EPA] further underscores the conclusion that policy
224. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *24,
*27, *29 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
225. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *24, *29.
226. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
227. Id. at 1453, 1456-57.
228. Id. at 1455.
229. Id. at 1456.
230. Id. at 1457.
231. Id. at 1458.
232. Id. at 1466.
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decisions concerning the authority and standards for carbon dioxide
emissions lie with the political branches of government.2 33 The court
concluded that Massachusetts v. EPA's "special solicitude" for state
standing supports the idea that policymaking about climate ought to be
left to the federally elected branches.234
Next, the court concluded that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Clean Air Act in Massachusetts v. EPA shows states have "surren-
dered" federal common law claims to EPA and the federal government,
including policy.
2 35
Finally, it determined that Massachusetts v. EPA does "not sanction
the justiciability of the interstate global warming damages tort claim now
before this Court., 236 Instead, the court construed the Supreme Court's
recognition of California's right to sue EPA for action to be a tacit rejec-
tion of the same state's ability to sue private parties for damages unre-
lated to EPA action.
3. Criticism of Application of Baker's "Initial Policy Determina-
tion" Prong
The courts in American Electric Power and General Motors misap-
plied this prong in at least three respects. First, the most salient criticism
of using this aspect of Baker to avoid the "global warming thicket" is
that it is patently wrong to conclude that the elected branches have yet to
make an initial policy determination.
233. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *30
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
234. Id. at *33-34 (internal citations omitted). The court wrote:
Underpinning the Supreme Court's standing analysis is the concept that the authority to
regulate carbon dioxide lies with the federal government, and more specifically with the
EPA as set forth in the CAA. Also inherent in the Supreme Court's reasoning is the prin-
ciple that any State that is dissatisfied with the federal government's global warming pol-
icy determinations may exercise its "procedural right" to advance its interests through
administrative channels and, if necessary, to "challenge the rejection of its rulemaking
petition as arbitrary and capricious." Thus, such an approach emphasizes that initial pol-
icy determinations are made by the political branches while preserving a framework for
judicial review of those determinations.
Id.
235. Id. at *35-36 (internal citations omitted). The court wrote:
The underpinnings of the Supreme Court's rationale in Massachusetts only reinforce this
Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs current tort claim would require this Court to make the
precise initial carbon dioxide policy determinations that should be made by the political
branches, and to the extent that such determination falls under the CAA, by the EPA.
Because the States have "surrendered" to the federal government their right to engage in
certain forms of regulations and therefore may have standing in certain circumstances to
challenge those regulations, and because new automobile carbon dioxide emissions are
such a regulation expressly left to the federal government, a resolution of this case would
thrust this Court beyond the bounds of justiciability. Plaintiff has failed to offer an ade-
quate explanation of how this Court would possibly endeavor to make the initial policy
determinations that would be both necessary and antecedent to a resolution of this case.
Id.
236. Id. at *36.
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To the contrary, there is direct evidence that the elected branches
have adopted a policy to reduce GHGs. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"policy" to include "[t]he general principles by which a government is
guided in its management of public affairs. 2 37 As evidenced by aver-
ments from the White House,238 the State Department, 3 9 and the EPA, 240
the United States has clearly adopted and currently adheres to a "general
principle" to reduce emissions of GHGs. 24 1 Legislative acquiescence to
this policy is evidenced by the Senate's ratification of the UNFCCC, and
by the numerous enactments to study climate change.24 2 Indeed, in his
dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA, Chief Justice Roberts perhaps put it
best: "[Global warming] is not a problem that has escaped the attention
of policymakers in the Executive and Legislative branches of our Gov-
ernment, who continue to consider regulatory, legislative and treaty-
based means of addressing global climate change. 2 43
Second, allowing states and individuals to pursue federal common
law causes of action is consistent with the policy of reducing GHG emis-
sions. Injuctive and legal relief constitutes not an establishment of initial
policy but instead an implementation of existing policy.
244
Third, deciding whether the "political question doctrine" applies has
little to do with whether the underlying policy issue is "complex," invites
social inefficiency, or is "political" in nature. Most people would agree
that issues of climate change are controversial, complex, and invite ac-
tion by the elected political branches. They might recognize that there
237. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004). Furthermore, Black's Law Dictionary
directs the reader to the term "public policy," which means "[b]roadly, principles and standards
regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being fundamental concern to the state and the whole
of society." Id. at 1267.
238. The White House, News & Policy, Policies in Focus, Energy,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/energy/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (addressing U.S. policy in
"confronting climate change" and energy security).
239. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, USA ACTIONS TO ADDRESS, ENERGY SECURITY, CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/96165.pdf (addressing domestic and international U.S. policy on climate change) (last
visited Mar. 26, 2008).
240. EPA, Council on Environmental Quality, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/global-
change.html#2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (addressing domestic U.S. climate change policy); see
also Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925
(Sept. 8, 2003). In explaining why it should not regulate automobile emissions, the EPA stated that
President Bush has "established a comprehensive global climate change policy designed to... take
sensible steps in the interim to reduce the risk of global climate change." Id
241. Pawa & Krass, supra note 63, at 461.
242. The fact that the United States does not agree with the proposals made under the Kyoto
Protocol does not inveigh the premise that the Unites States has an overall emissions reduction
policy. Federal policies can be inferred. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione
Motonave Achille Lauro In Administrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1991) ("given
the Executive Branch's repeated condemnation of international terrorism, we believe that any initial
policy that might conceivably be required has already been made.").
243. 127 S. Ct. 1464 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
244. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change and the Courts, 28 No. 5 ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP.
* 12 (2007). Professor Kaswan explains that our country has a "long tradition of relying on the
courts to make important policy determinations" when courts are faced with common law claims.
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should be more socially efficient means of assigning and allocating CO 2
caps, imposing timelines for the development of pollution control
equipment, and reconciling both with U.S. policy, rather than through
litigation. Furthermore, they might feel that the elected political
branches should take action, and that party politics informs climate
change policy.
Yet acknowledging that climate policy is "political" in nature does
not counsel in favor of using the political question doctrine to subvert
climate cases due to some perceived lack of initial policymaking by the
elected branches. A "political" issue and a "political question" are two
different things. The former allows judicial oversight; the latter suggests
that overriding separation of powers concerns warrant judicial restraint.
Because climate change claims involve public, domestic and foreign
policy and political matters, "it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that
such claims are barred by the political question doctrine., 245 Yet as the
Supreme Court observed when it adopted the modem test for identifying
non-justiciable political questions, "'it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cog-
nizance. ' 
24 6
V. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF APPLYING THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE TO CLIMATE CASES
Applying the political question to climate cases warrants additional
criticism surrounding whether the doctrine is constitutionally legitimate,
consistent with the role of the courts, and consonant with regular rejec-
tion of the doctrine in other contexts.
A. Basic Illegitimacy of the Political Question Doctrine
While extensive critical exegesis of the doctrine's origins and justi-
fications is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to appreciate
that it has invited wide criticism. First, the doctrine itself is not tethered
to any language in the Constitution. Inherently a matter of constitutional
theory and interpretation, the political question doctrine seems at war
with the text of the Constitution, which grants federal courts "judicial
authority" to resolve "cases and controversies" without any mention of
limitation as to "political questions., 247 Hence, the political question is a
gloss on judicial authority in a separation of powers rubric; the Constitu-
245. Id. at * 15 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
246. Id. at *15-16 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
247. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1.
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tion does not admit of any jurisdictional bar to prevent federal courts
from ruling on "political questions" or the like.248
Second, the doctrine seems to be inconsistent with an originalist's
view of a tripartite constitutional system with coordinate legislative, ex-
ecutive and judicial branches "checking" each other's power.249 To be
sure, 200 years ago in the nation's quintessential "political" case, Chief
Justice John Marshall famously wrote that "[i]t is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the [courts] to say what the law is." '250
Third, the doctrine is unnecessary. There is no constitutionally-
founded reason for federal courts to duck controversial issues so as to
protect the legitimacy of the court's decisions: "[T]he federal courts'
legitimacy is quite robust, [] there is no evidence that particular rulings
have any effect on the judiciary's legitimacy, and [] in any event, the
courts' mission should be to uphold the Constitution and not worry about
political capital. 251
Fourth, the doctrine is incongruous with political theory that extols
judicial restraint in the face of action by the elected branches. It instead
"confuses deference with abdication." 252 Thus, despite marking what
most consider is the nation's quintessential "political" case, the Court in
Marbury v. Madison did not evoke the political question doctrine in
reaching the issue of whether Mr. Marbury was entitled to the commis-
sion awarded him by President Adams that James Madison, President
Jefferson's Secretary of State, refused to serve. 3
Fifth, at least applied to stop state action, it seems to work a rent in
the fabric of federalism. States have long turned to federal courts to help
resolve disputes with other states, with industry and with individuals.
The political question doctrine denies states the constitutional access to
federal venues to address matters left unattended by the federal govern-
ment. In such instances, the doctrine seems to starve the states of the
ability to protect the very sovereignty and dignity the Tenth Amendment
"reserved. 254
Sixth, it fails to recognize the public/private law dichotomy in our
political system. Public laws generally cannot and are not intended to
provide rights and remedies for private harm. Likewise, private common
248. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question " Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 624-25
(1976).
249. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 131-32 (As-
pen Law & Business 2d ed. 2002); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
viii (2d ed. 1988) ("The highest mission of the Supreme Court... is not to conserve judicial credi-
bility.").
250. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
251. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 249, at 132.
252. Id.
253. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146-47.
254. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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law is not foreclosed when the elected branches have failed sufficiently
to provide private redress.
B. Inconsistency with Federal Judicial Functions
The reasoning exhibited in the American Electric Power and Gen-
eral Motors cases seems unduly solicitous of the elected branches. It
leaves little, if any, judicial role in resolving complex tort actions based
on transboundary pollution problems in the absence of action by the
elected branches--even though such circumstances are those in which
judicial involvement is most apropos. The negative manifestations of
this undue deference to the political branches in climate cases are six-
fold.
First, it endorses judicial abdication as a legitimate response to leg-
islative and executive impotency. Responses to climate change invite
responses by "virtually every sector of the U.S. economy," and they are
not limited solely to congressional and executive responses.255 As Pro-
fessor Kaswan notes:
The courts' use of the political-question doctrine not only creates the
threat of a legal vacuum when the political branches are paralyzed, it
also ignores the common law's critical role in the evolution of the
law. As victims respond to serious environmental problems by going
directly to the courts, they create political pressure for more compre-
hensive and appropriate legislative solutions. Historically, the threat
of common law liability gave affected industries an incentive to sup-
port, rather than resist, more comprehensive environmental regula-
tion by the political branches.
25 6
Second, it assumes too much by deciding that inaction in the politi-
257cal branches equates to a policy decision. This reasoning strips the
courts of jurisdiction in all matters in which Congress and the Executive
are at a standstill. On the contrary, lack of action in the elective branches
may just as readily suggest the opposite result, that is, it is for the courts,
and not Congress and the President, to fulfill their traditional interstitial
role of providing common law relief in those instances where statutory or
regulatory relief is not available.
This reasoning also seems inherently inconsistent. While the court
in American Electric Power found inaction in the political branches to be
indicative of a need for initial policy by the elected branches, the court in
General Motors seemed to conclude that inaction suggests that the politi-
255. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
256. Kaswan, Climate Change and the Courts, supra note 244 at * 12 ("The very complexity of
the issues at stake, and the power of the affected interest groups, could hobble political responses for
some time. Courts do not have the luxury of delay.").
257. Id.
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cal branches have already made an initial policy determination to which
the courts should defer: "The political branches' actions and deliberate
inactions in the area of global warming further highlight this case as one
for nonjudicial discretion. 258 Moreover, the court seemed to conclude
that once the elected branches "addressed the issues" of global climate
change-no matter how-the courts are rendered powerless:
An examination of the political branches' consideration of the issues
surrounding global climate change counsels against an initial policy
determination to be made by the courts. As early as 1978, and as re-
cent as the current administration, the elected branches of govern-
ment have addressed the issues of climate change and global warm-
ing.... [R]eductions in carbon dioxide emissions is an issue still un-
der active consideration by those branches of government.
25 9
Third, it reflects a false presumption that a problem that vexes the
other branches is indicative of one in which the court should avoid the
political thicket: "Looking at the past and current actions (and deliberate
inactions) of Congress and the Executive within the United States and
globally in response to the issue of climate change merely reinforces my
opinion that the questions raised . . . are non-judiciable political ques-
tions. 26°
Fourth, it incorrectly assumes that political paralysis in the elected
branches is due deference. Yet courts are not only permitted to adjudi-
cate a dispute involving a matter already subject to public law. On the
contrary, private law causes of action are an important element in our
federal and state adjudicative machinery.
Fifth, reliance on Massachusetts v. EPA to support the doctrine's
application to climate seems dubious at best. If anything, Massachusetts
v. EPA reinforces rather than reduces state authority to address climate
change. For example, rather than interpreting the "special solicitude"
analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA to support climate cases, the court in
General Motors held that it provides "convincing force" in support of
just the opposite.26' Furthermore, rather than reading Massachusetts v.
258. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *24
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
259. Id.
260 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
261. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *36-37 (internal citations omitted). The court
observed:
[T]he Supreme Court's analysis on the issue of standing counsels with convincing force
to the contrary. As noted above, a State has standing to pursue its "procedural right"
through administrative channels, and if necessary, to "challenge the rejection of its rule-
making petition as arbitrary and capricious" as did the plaintiffs in Massachusetts.
Unlike the procedural posture of Massachusetts, the current case is not before the Court
by way an administrative challenge to an EPA's decision, but rather as an interstate
global warming damages tort claim. Plaintiff's argument essentially ignores this proce-
dural distinction.
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EPA to suggest that the elected branches have made "initial policy de-
terminations" about global climate change, it reached the opposite re-
sult,262 utterly ignoring the first paragraph of Chief Justice Roberts' dis-
senting opinion.
Last, it improperly concludes that federal courts should steer clear
of factually complex cases involving transboundary pollution. In Ameri-
can Electric Power, for example, the court was unwilling to impose pol-
lution control requirements for what would have been hundreds of coal,
oil and gas fired facilities of various ages and geographic distribution.
Yet this seems to run counter to a rich history of cases in which federal
courts have imposed injunctions in cases involving transboundary pollu-
tion, 263 even those subject to international negotiations and treaties264
described above. This point is especially poignant insofar as the Su-
preme Court found that the tradition of federal courts hearing state com-
mon law causes of action for public nuisance supports its decision that
states are entitled to "special solicitude" for standing purposes. Such
solicitude seems to evaporate, however, when the common law cause is
one in public nuisance for climate change.
C. Inconsistency with Reasoning in Other Contexts
Using the political question doctrine to hinder federal common law
causes of action to address climate change is also inconsistent with ap-
plied jurisprudence in other contexts, particularly involving transbound-
ary pollution for which Congress has not provided equitable or legal re-
lief authority.265 For example, in In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
Products Liability Litigation,266 the plaintiffs brought a public nuisance
claim due to groundwater contamination from Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (MTBE) and Tertiary Butyl Alcohol (TBA). The defendants
claimed the political question doctrine barred the action, based on the
Id.
262. Id. at *37 (internal citations omitted). Here, the court says:
Similarly, the Court finds Plaintiff's attempt to equate this Court's decision on justiciabil-
ity with the EPA's decision on whether to regulate carbon dioxide emissions to be prob-
lematic. The EPA's global warming carbon dioxide policymaking determinations are
statutorily governed by the CAA, and are therefore not analogous the justiciability prin-
ciples which govern the issues now before the Court.
Id.
263. Brenner, supra note 67, at 421.
264. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273 n.9.
265. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364-65 (1lth Cir.
2007) ("As the case appears to be an ordinary tort suit, there is no impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.") (internal quotations
omitted); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Admin-
istrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The fact that the issues before us arise in a
politically charged context does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-
justiciable political question.").
266. 438 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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"'relevant economic, environmental, energy and security interests impli-
cated by plaintiffs' effort to ban MTBE.'
2 7
The court rejected this argument. As with GHGs, it noted that Con-
gress had studied but did not regulate the use of MTBE and TBA. 268 It
drew a distinction between judicial policymaking and judicial review of
cases and controversies: "[d]efendants have blurred the line between a
determination of whether defendants are liable for water pollution...
and a policy determination regarding the composition of the country's
fuel supply.
'" 269
Similarly, in McKay v. United States270 landowners brought a suit
against a nuclear weapons facility. In reversing the lower court's dis-
missal on political question grounds, the Tenth Circuit explained that
"political aspects present in ... the decision to manufacture nuclear
components [does not] rule out all the possible remedies which are avail-
able to people who are physically hurt or materially hurt.",271 Succinctly,
the court concluded, "the political question theory ... [does] not [] pre-
vent individual tort recoveries.,
272
This is especially true for cases, like General Motors, where the
plaintiffs seek money damages. For example, in Koohi v. United
States, 273 the Ninth Circuit determined that the political question doctrine
is not implicated in tort claims where the "plaintiftf] seek[s] only dam-
ages for [its] injuries. '274 Instead of turning the case away under the po-
litical question doctrine, it held that "[d]amage actions are particularly
manageable. 275
All of this suggests that the political question doctrine is not well
suited to disable the use of federal common law causes of action for cli-
mate change.
CONCLUSION
The effects of climate change are disproportionately absorbed by
states, individuals, and discrete, insular minorities and others who are
compromised in the democratic bazaar. Federal common law causes of
action for public nuisance provide a potential means for addressing these
effects. Nonetheless, electing not to "enter the global warming thicket,"
some federal courts have incorrectly invoked the political question doc-
267. Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 301.
269. Id. at 300; see also Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49 (distinguishing between political assess-
ment of terrorism and allocation of liability).
270. 703 F.2d 464, 465 (10th Cir. 1983).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 470.
273. 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
274. Id. at 1332.
275. Id.
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trine in declining to entertain common law causes of action for public
nuisance seeking abatement or damages for the effects of climate change.
This article concludes that these courts have been too quick to embrace
the idea that the doctrine serves as a bar to such actions. There is no
constitutional or prudential justification for relegating climate change
entirely to the political branches. The political question doctrine does
not prevent courts from entering this thicket.

